Duquesne Law Review
Volume 23

Number 2

Article 6

1985

History and Legal Discourse: The Language of the New Legal
History [Essay]
Samuel J. Astorino

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Samuel J. Astorino, History and Legal Discourse: The Language of the New Legal History [Essay], 23 Duq.
L. Rev. 363 (1985).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol23/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Essay
History and Legal Discourse: The Language of the
New Legal History
Samuel J. Astorino*
Since the 1950's, American legal history has been increasingly
reoriented towards a new mode of historical analysis that primarily
focuses on private common law subjects rather than on constitutional development. Aptly termed the "New Legal History" by
scholars currently working in this field, its emphasis has dramatically shifted from the study of such subjects as the Supreme Court,
biographies, histories of isolated historical periods, constitutional
history and legal institutions, to the rules and doctrines of torts,
contracts, property, and related common law themes. While it is
difficult to set an exact date, this process of recasting legal history
began to take shape by mid-1950's and certainly emerged as a distinctive historical school by the following decade.'
The principal cause of this change in perspective appears to
have been a growing conviction that traditional constitutional history has simply failed to accurately portray the role of law as an
integral part of the social order. Following Karl N. Llewellyn and
other legal Realists of the 1940's and 1950's, the new legal historians likewise concluded that constitutional analysis was arid, formalistic, and far-removed from the actual functions of the common
law.2 A true understanding of the law of the real world and its so* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Ph.D, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., Duquesne University.
1. White, Book Review, 59 VA. L. REV. 1130 (1973) (reviewing FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW

(1973)), reprinted in

WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

3

(1978); Billings, Law in Colonial America: The Reassessment of Early American Legal History, 81 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1983).
2. Scheiber, American Constitutional History and The New Legal History: Complimentary Themes in Two Modes, 68 J. AM. HIST. 340 (1981).
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cial impact was possible, it was now theorized, only through an investigation of common law categories. In this context, Morton Horwitz has insisted that "constitutional law in America represents
episodic legal intervention buttressed by a rhetorical tradition that
is often an unreliable guide to the slower (and more often unconscious) processes of legal change in America. ' The New Legal History thereby constitutes both a response to the perceived impoverishment of constitutional law and an invigorating effort to explore
the implications of the structure and substance of American law at
its most basic level of operation. That is, legal historians can learn
more about contract law at the turn of the century, for example, by
dusting off Regional Reporters than by "pouring through
'4
casebooks on Constitutional Law."
The pioneer of. this New Legal History was J. Willard Hurst of
the University of Wisconsin. Hurst and his students, particularly
Lawrence Friedman, took the "social function of law" as the pivotal point of their research. Hurst's monumental study, The Law
and Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century sought to
"understand the law not so much as it may appear to philosophers
but more as it had meaning for workaday people and was shaped
by them to their wants and vision. ' Legal history comes from the
bottom up,6 and the Regional Reporters, the repository of common
law decisions, are the bottom. The "social function of law," moreover, means that economic forces in particular have exerted a compelling influence on legal change. While constitutional law is downgraded in importance because of its separation of law and politics,
the New Legal History insists that the evolution of American law
cannot be studied in isolation from attending social, political and
3.

M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 xii (1977).

4. Speziale, The Turn of the Twentieth Century as the Dawn of Contract 'Interpretation': Reflections in Theories of Impossibility, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 555, 559 n.14 (1979). Speziale borrows Horwitz's methodology. Scheiber, supra note 2, states that:
The essence of the field's problem, as many contend, is that scholarly interest in the
traditional care of constitutional history-the doctrines and behaviour of courts-has
been overshadowed by a distinctly different mode of investigation, one that is often
termed 'the new legal history'. . . . The new legal history, taking the whole legal system as its province and stressing the interactions of change in law with socioeconomic
developments, offers perspectives on American history in many vital respects, different from the perspectives of constitutional history.
Id. at 337.
5. J. HURST, THE LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 5
(1956).
6. Hurst, The Law in United States History, in 104 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 60 (1960).
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especially economic circumstances. The monographs produced by
the Wisconsin School, as well as the work of scholars like Richard
B. Morris, Leonard Levy, Carl Haskin, Harry Scheiber and Morton
Horwitz, describe this evolution as "instrumentalist" or "redistributive" in the sense that subnational law demonstrates how lawyers
helped to transform the United States from an agrarian to an industrial economy.7
The sharp criticisms posed by the New Legal History contributed significantly to the present crisis in the field of Constitutional
History. Harry Scheiber has cogently identified the causes of this
crisis: the impact of behavioralism and value-free analysis; the
dwindling concern with law and history in the Academy; the rise of
social history and corresponding subordination of law, policy and
public affairs to concern for the private place; and the erosion
caused by the New Legal History in its emulation of social history
through an emphasis on private law doctrines. Finally, in its neoMarxist form at least, the New Legal History holds that "Constitutionalism is nothing more than hypocrisy. . . .The classic constitutional values are seen as mere smokescreens that obscure
exploitation."
All this, of course, is familiar enough to legal historians. The crisis facing constitutional history and the characteristics of the New
Legal History are topics that have engaged legal scholars in recent
years. This essay, however, addresses a related issue which, it is
7. J. HURST, THE LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 236 (1960). This
is not to suggest that the new legal history, considered as a whole, is neo-Marxist in orientation. Although a full-scale history of the new school has not yet appeared in print, it is
readily apparent that two wings have already appeared, representing both a neo-Marxist
perspective and a consensus approach. Horwitz reflects the neo-Marxist position that American legal history, at least in the nineteenth century, portrays a conflictual-exploitive pattern. See Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977); Genovese, Book Review, 91 HAiv. L. REV 726 (1978) (reviewing M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977)); Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973); THE POLITICS OF THE
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982). One of the best neo-Marxist statements
on American law is Tushnet, A Marxist Interpretation of American Law, MARXIST PERSPECTIvES: A JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND CULTURE (Spring 1978). Hurst, on the other hand,
while recognizing the importance of economic factors, insisted that "the richness of
America's past" cannot be fully explained by Marxist theory alone. See Hurst, Book Review,
21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 175 (1977) (reviewing HoRwrrz, supra note 3). See also WHITE, TORT
LAW IN AMERICA, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (1980). A thorough examination of this problem deserves further study and should be on any future agenda dealing with the new legal
history.
8. Scheiber, supra note 2, at 334-38, suggests an ingenious approach that may bridge
the chasm.
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suggested, represents an equally formidable dilemma in the field:
the ability of non-lawyer historians to adequately comprehend the
technical nature of common law developments in order to be able
to integrate the findings of New Legal History into general American history. On the one hand, the issue must be defined as one
which tends to divide the academic competencies of lawyer-historians and non-lawyer historians. Is "lawyer's legal history"9 with its
inherent conceptual legalese and terms of art susceptible to understanding by lay persons uneducated in the law? On the other hand,
it forces the issue of the ultimate worth of the New Legal History's
contribution to our general understanding of America's past. For if
those contributions are to be fully utilized by non-lawyer historians, then it is imperative that the gap created by the technical nature of legal discourse be breached by scholars on both sides. Can
the writing of American history be truly complete in the absence of
substantial reference to the historiography of the new school?
Historians have made a great deal of progress in assimilating
both the methodologies and findings of related disciplines, especially the social sciences. During the last several decades, which
incidentally comprise an age of remarkable productivity, American
history has been rewritten in terms borrowed from economics, sociology, anthropology and psychology. Even the mystifying science of
statistical analysis has been let in the door and honored with its
own title of cliometrics.' 0 Modification of the old political-diplomatic-economic approach to the past attests to the intellectual
health and increasing sophistication of the discipline. But it is
equally true, nevertheless, that the rather dramatic interpretations
advanced by the New Legal Historians have been woefully neglected and have not yet been absorbed into the mainstream of
American historiography.
Given the quality and quantity of work generated by the New
Legal Historians, this is indeed strange. After all, for example, two
of the stellar productions of the New School, Horwitz's Transformation of American Law and Friedman's History of American
Law, have been in print since 1973 and 1977 respectively. Moreover, Horwitz's book was awarded the prestigious Bancroft Prize in
American History in 1978, and his first chapter had previously appeared in one of the most reputable periodicals in American his9. The phrase belongs to Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of
American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 281 (1973).
10. The obvious reference is to R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS (1974).
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tory.11 Yet the fact remains that none of the introductory textbooks in American history currently on the market have either
incorporated the new work or cited them in their bibliographies.
Invariably, the interpretation of economic expansion of antebellum
America, as an illustration, has not yet been stretched far enough
to incorporate changes wrought by the common law.1 2 Horwitz may
be incorrect in his conclusion that these changes were exploitive in
nature, but it is simply wrong to totally ignore the established fact
that judicial decision-making in that era was a substantial causative factor. But this is not surprising; in his own day, Hurst himself
was afforded similar treatment by American historians. 13
Efforts to understand the reasons for this failure to integrate
must begin with a consideration of persistent objections leveled by
non-lawyer-historians to the technical language employed by lawyer-historians. Traditional legal history, with its accentuated constitutional-political themes, has been largely comprehensible to
professional historians and political scientists. In most respects,
constitutional history is often taught as an exercise in political
11. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumentalist Conception of American Law, 5
PEBsP. AM. HIST. 287 (1971).
12. J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed.
1983); R. WILSON, J. GILBERT, S. NISSENBAUM, D. ScoTr, C. EARLE & R. HOFFMAN, THE PURSUIT OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1st ed. 1984); T. BAILEY & D. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT. A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC (7th ed. 1983); W. JORDAN, THE
UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1982); G. TINDALL, AMERICA, A NARRATIVE HISTORY (1984); J. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST (1984); M. NORTON, D. KATZMAN, P. EsCOLT, H. CHUDACOFF, T.
PATTERSON & W. TUTrLE, A PEOPLE AND A NATION (1982); R. DIVINE, T. BREEN, G. FREDERICKSON & R. WILLIAMS, AMERICA PAST AND PRESENT (1984); B. BAILYN, R. DAVID, H. DONALD,
J. THOMAS, R. WIEBE & G. WOOD, THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1981); R. KELLY, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN PAST (1982); J. CARY & J. WEINBERG,
THE SOCIAL FABRIC, AMERICAN LIFE FROM 1607 TO 1877 (1983); Older texts such as S. MoRroSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1965), and J. BLUM, E. MORGAN, A.
SCHLESINGER, K. STAMPP & C. VAN WOODWARD, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE (3d ed. 1973),

also failed to incorporate the findings of Pound or Hurst.
13. The only textbook in American History to cite HURST, supra note 5, is C. DOLLAR,
J. GUNDERSON, R. SATZ, H. NELSON & G. RICHARD, AMERICA, CHANGING TIMES (2d ed. 1982).
But chapter eight of this text, entitled "Genesis of Industrial America," shows no appreciation of Hurst's work. See the statement by Flaherty, An Approach to American History:
Willard Hurst as Legal Historian, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 222, 230, 234 (1970): "Willard
Hurst's writings have suffered most from their apparent neglect by the legal and historical
professions ....
Where American legal history could once be ignored by American historians with a certain justification, such an excuse is no longer tenable." Id. In 1969 Lawrence
Friedman wrote that "[tihe non-lawyer historians have no need to feel ashamed of their
contributions ....
Yet, it is true that historians have not paid legal history its due. Nonlawyer historians have probably been frightened by the tough and impenetrable surface of
legal materials." Friedman, Book Review, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 277 (1969) (reviewing EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW (D. FLAHERTY ed. 1969)).
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thought.1 4 The technical language of contracts, torts and property,
on the other hand, is often regarded as a forbidding twilight zone
to those who lack specialized education in law.
Historians are generally well-aware that the New Legal History
has altered the conceptual foundations of their discipline, but for
many who lack legal education, the language barrier often seems so
insurmountable as to frustrate any efforts to achieve some semblance of clarity. Morton Horwitz, educated in both law and political science, summarized the problem by noting that because legal
history has been "[w]ritten largely by lawyers, it has been stamped
by lawyer-like concerns." In his view:
One of the most important characteristics of the writing of American legal-as opposed to constitutional-history, is that it has almost exclusively
been written by lawyers. The study of the history of American law inevitably involves the mastery of technical, legal doctrine, which barring such distinguished and extraordinary, rare exceptions as Leonard Levy's study of
Chief Justice Shaw, seems to have left historians paralyzed with fear."5

The non-lawyer American colonial historian, Warren Billings,
has similarly complained that:
The attention given to the autonomy of early American law had a consequence that was as predictable as it was harmful. By stressing technicalities,
legal scholars engendered the myth that only they who spoke the special
language of law were capable of interpreting the law's history to others. It is
quite understandable how such men, given their orientation, should seek to
cloak their discipline with professional mysteries. Moreover, the nature of
law like that of natural sciences, does require special skills of its historians
which others obviously do not. But, by making the mysteries and skills appear to be so unusual, if not downright arcane, they erected a body of
knowledge so peculiar that it seemed to say almost nothing to the uninitiated colonialist. And so, colonial historians tended to ignore their period's
legal history and its sources altogether."

To G. Edward White, a lawyer with a doctorate in American Studies, a major dilemma faces the non-lawyer historian:
Analyzing the legal source materials requires the technical skills imparted
by a legal education: the majority of historians are deterred from doing research in legal materials by their inability to read the relevant sources. Taking the time to acquire the necessary skills, for an historian, is in many
instances far more costly than simply choosing a less formidable area of
14. For example, F. McDoNALD, A
(1982).
15. Horwitz, supra note 9, at 275.
16. Billings, supra note 1, at 954.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
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specialization.7

Hurst was also cognizant of the problem, although he believed that
a formal degree in law was unnecessary:
One does not have to be a lawyer to do useful legal history; a good deal of
distinguished publication by non-lawyers already demonstrates that. But
the formal materials of the law-constitutions, statutes, executive and administrative rules and orders, present technical barriers to the uninitiated.
Getting over these barriers calls for some special skills in dissecting legal
source materials. Three years of law study are not necessary to develop the
level of skills non-lawyer historians need in order to handle legal sources
capably for a good many kinds of legal historical studies. 8

When Friedman and Scheiber published their anthology of writings on American legal history entitled American Law and the
Constitutional Order, the reviewer for the American Journal of
Legal History took serious exception to the claim of the authors
that the book was clear enough for a general audience of historians, despite the technicality and jargon used by lawyers. "Certainly, one can only agree with the authors about technicality and
jargon," noted the reviewer. "However, some of their selections,
jargonistic or not, are very heavy going. Unless the instructor is
prepared to provide carefully-thought-out background material
both in terms of ideas as well as basic legal terminology-excerpts
such as Wechsler's 'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law,' or Charles Reich's 'The New Property' will not carry the impact they should."19
Reviews of the Transformation of American Law afford an excellent case study on this specific issue. To Horwitz, the method of
presenting technical material was crucial to his task as he soberly
pondered the dilemma: "My first aspiration in this book is to make
the history of technical and obscure areas of American Law accessible to professional historians and to other nonlegally trained
scholars." The problem, however, is "with choices about how technical to get." The "internal structure of a discipline" should not be
sacrificed, but specialists cannot be deprived of data or the nonspecialist be misled as to the "essential texture and structure of
historical change within the discipline." "It has been my ardent
17. White, supra note 1, at 3.
18. Hurst, Old and New Dimensions of Research in American Legal History, 23 AM.
J. LEGAL HIsT. 1, 1-2 (1979).
19. The reviewer was historian Jonathan Lurie of Rutgers in 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 93
(1980). Professor Lurie is the author of THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1895-1905: THE DYNAMICS OF SELF-REGULATON (1979), a study of business-government relations.
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desire to reach the general historian. I am aware, nevertheless, that
which general readers will find
there are many points in this book
20
purposes.
their
for
too technical
The language problem was a recurring theme among non-lawyer
reviewers of Horwitz's book. Although the problem admittedly
emerged in a minor form compared to considerations of the merits
of Horwitz's thesis, there was an explicit suspicion among these reviewers that the subject-matter may be too difficult for non-lawyers to grasp. In this vein, David Flaherty, a historian, prophetically remarked that "It will be a great tragedy if economic,
political, and intellectual historians of antebellum America, who
are ultimately the largest audience for the Transformation of
American Law, do not make the necessary effort to assimilate the
author's findings into their understanding of the era." Nevertheless, Flaherty also found the book to be technically difficult:
Horwitz is well aware of the importance of translating the mysterious science of the law into more general and accessible categories for professional
historians and other non-legally trained scholars (p.xi). Yet it is debatable
whether he has succeeded in his goal of general communication. While the
general thesis and many of the chapters are readily comprehensible, parts of
the volume, especially the lengthy chapter on developments in contract law,
are very difficult reading either for practicing historians or for generally educated readers. In my view, only specialists would be able to understand
and evaluate the validity of Horwitz's major discussion of how the law of
contract was transformed in an increasingly commercial society by the development of extensive markets and how the equitable conception of contract law was overthrown by the will theory after 1825. The chapters treating substantive law are formidable reading.2 '

For historian Stephen Botein, speaking of Horwitz and the New
Legal History:
The strength of its appeal outside the confines of law schools will probably
depend upon the extent of their success in exposing the legal subject matter
to scrutiny from other disciplines. However fully this program is realized,
academic lawyers will continue to predominate in studying the history of
American legal doctrine on the basis of both training and occupational
needs.2

20. HoRWrrZ, supra note 3, at xi. Horwitz has written an unpublished paper entitled
The Place of Justice Holmes in American Legal Thought, which is often so technical that
only lawyers could understand it; this paper is cited with the written permission of Professor Horwitz.
21. Flaherty, Book Review, 76 MICH. L. REV. 551, 554 (1978) (reviewing HoRwrrz,
supra note 3).
22. Botein, ProfessionalHistory Reconsidered, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 60, 60-61 (1977).
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Historians can assist "in writing the history of American lawyers, if
not law." Another historian, Maxwell Bloomfield, concluded that
"it should be required reading for law students, as well as for law
professors and practitioners. ' 23 Erich Foner reviewed the Transformation of American Law for the New York Review of Books
and similarly complained that while the study of law should not be
left to lawyers:
Until recently, the history of American law has centered in law schools and
has been written by and for lawyers. Apart from an interest in constitutional cases, American historians have tended to avoid the field: their feelings of inadequacy in dealing with technical legal doctrines and procedure
are surpassed only by their terror when confronted with statistics.24

David J. Rothman underscored the fact that legal history, even after Brandeis and Pound, remained "self-encapsulated" by refusing
to consider the impact of prevailing economic and social conditions
on the law. "The reasons for the lag," said Rothman, were
[niot especially difficult to understand. For one, it was the law professors
who wrote legal history, not historians. The former were trained exclusively
to analyze cases not social change. The latter, again, excluding the likes of
Richard Morris or Oscar Hamdlin, found the law either too abstruse or too
mysterious.25

Lawyers who reviewed the Transformationof American Law, on
the other hand, either failed to comment on the problem of technical language or tended to agree with the reviewer for the American
Bar Association Journal that Horwitz succeeded in making his
work "accessible to a multi-disciplinary readership. '26 One of Horwitz's own students concluded that "It does not become so technical that only lawyers versed in common law principles can read it.
It is accessible not only to those who have studied trespass de
bonis asportatis or trover or assumpsit, but also to non-lawyers
who may wonder what we lawyers do."27
It is ironic, nevertheless, that reviews written by lawyers con23. Bloomfield, Book Review, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1102, 1105 (1977) (reviewing HORWITZ,
supra note 3).
24. Foner, Get a Lawyer, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 3, 1977, at 38.
25. Rothman, The Promise of American Legal History, REviEws IN AMERICAN HISTORY
II 16 (March 1974).
26. Edward & Veitsch, 64 A.B.A. J. 384 (1978). See also Arnold, Book Review, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 241 (1977) (reviewing HORWITZ, supra note 3). A non-lawyer historian in agreement is J. KETTNER, 8 J. INTER-DIscIPLINARY HiST. 392 (1977): "Non-legal scholars will bene-

fit from his masterful explanation of technical change in legal doctrines and procedures." Id.
27. Goda, Book Review, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 275, 275 (1979) (reviewing HoRwrrz,
supra note 3).
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tained legal analysis cast in the technical language of common law
rules and principles: strict liability, quantum meruit, trespass and
trespass on the case, negligence, will theory of contract. 2 None of
this technical analysis appeared in reviews by non-lawyer-historians. The contrast effectively begs the question of whether non-lawyer-historians are able to understand even the reviews of Horwitz,
let alone the book itself. The two types of reviews were clearly addressed to two different audiences. And that is precisely the issue
presently facing the New Legal History.
By significantly replenishing the field, the New Legal History
has once again drawn attention to the crucial importance of a historical perspective to both the lawyer and the historian. In the
past, there was certainly little doubt about this, although interest
in legal history has fluctuated between boom and bust. Holmes
himself insisted in The Common Law that "[t]he Law embodies
the story of a nation's development for . . . [iln order to know
what it is, we must know what it has been and what it tends to
become. ' 29 Others, such as James Barr Ames, Melvin Bigelow and
James Bradley Thayer, kept the flame alive thereafter through an
abiding commitment to the historical study of law. Many of them,
including Holmes, carried on an extensive correspondence on this
subject with Frederick W. Maitland. Their age has been described
as "a classical period" of legal history. It came to an end in approx28. See, e.g., Williams, Book Review, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1187 (1978) (reviewing HORWITZ, supra note 3); LaPiana, Book Review, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (1977) (reviewing
HORWITZ, supra note 3); Novick, Book Review, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 178 (reviewing Hoawrrz,
supra note 3); Smith, Book Review, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1253 (reviewing HoRwrrz, supra note
3); However, both Hurst's review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 175 (1977), and Gilmore's review,
86 YALE L.J. 788 (1977), were devoid of technical language and are certainly comprehensible
to general historians. Stephen Presser's superb review, Revising the Conservative Tradition:
Towards a New American Legal History, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 700 (1977), should also be intelligible to non-lawyers.
29. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459, 469 (1897):
The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history
of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of personal jests,
tends to make good citizens and good men.
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History must
be a part of the study ... because it is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When
you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count
his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the
first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful
animal.
Id. See also HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1964), which tells more about
Hurst than it does about Holmes.
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imately 1900 and it was not revived until three decades later by
such scholars as Richard B. Morris, Roscoe Pound, Julius Goebel
and by the proddings as well, of jurists like Felix Frankfurter.3"
With Hurst and the common law approach to legal history, the cycle turned favorably once again, but this time it has been decidedly
energized by scholars who have been for the most part producing
"lawyer's legal history."
The restoration of an historical perspective to the study of
American law is a decisive first step initially necessary in order to
help break down the concerns of lawyers with only the present status of rules, doctrines and argumentation which they are called
upon to employ on a daily basis. Grant Gilmore, a lawyer who easily practiced the historian's craft, attacked the methodological
presentism of lawyers by calling for the abandonment of the
"[a]nti-historical bias which has characterized most legal writing in
this century."'" For similar reasons, Maitland once remarked,
"Lawyers do not make good historians because the legal method
often conflicts with historical objectivity. ' 32 To what degree the
contrasting methodologies are responsible for the existing divergencies between law and history is a subject worthy of further debate. At this moment, the dispute is underscored by the recent
controversy surrounding the failure of lawyers to complete the
multi-volume history of the Supreme Court planned for by the socalled "Holmes Devise" which provoked Stanley Katz, legal historian at Princeton, to exclaim, "Lawyers are arrogant and think
they can do anything, including write history."3
The restoration of an historical perspective to legal studies, however, resolves only one horn of the dilemma. As suggested by this
essay, the other dimension of the problem is to write the New Legal History in a language which is comprehensible to general historians. As other disciplines, particularly the social sciences, have
enriched our understanding of the past through the introduction of
new analytical modes, so, too, must there be a way to combine the
results of the New Legal History with the vocabulary of general
30. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography,10 L. & Soc. REv. 14 (1975). On Frankfurter, see ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY
IN HONOR OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1966).
31. Gilmore, Age of Antiquarius, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 475, 475 (1972).
32. Bridwell, Theme and Reality in American Legal History: A Commentary on Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 and in the Common Law in
America, 53 IND. L.J. 449, 452 (1978).
33. As quoted in the N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983.
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history. The historian, David Flaherty, was correct in insisting that
"[w]hether one is formally trained as a lawyer or historian or both,
the governing consideration is the need to write legal history as
34
history.
While the problem is not susceptible to ready solutions, it appears that the burden must inevitably shift to lawyer-historians
who alone possess the required competence to deal with the technical subject-matter of the common law to inform general history.
Admittedly, like Horwitz, as lawyers they are saddled with a legacy
of an enduring conceptual short hand whose only integrity may be
easily compromised by facile explanations.3 5 As historians, nevertheless, they are equally encumbered with a corresponding responsibility to speak intelligently to their colleagues. The New Legal
History cannot remain either encapsulated or a prisoner of its own
language. Maitland's Inaugural Lecture on his appointment to the
Downing Chair of English Law in 1888 dealt with the topic of
"[w]hy the history of English law is not written." His answer at
that time was that the incompatibility of legal and historical points
of view-different methods in outlook-prevented any significant
mixture. Yet, according to Theodore F. T. Plucknett, although
Maitland's first career was as a lawyer, by 1903 he had been called
on to contribute to the Cambridge Modern History. In Plucknett's
words, "Maitland had finally demonstrated that legal history is not
to be confined to the faculty of law, and that the legal historian
shares the whole realm of history with his fellow historians. ' s6 But
that was nearly a century ago. For the present, again having
demonstrated that legal history is an indispensable academic endeavor, the New Legal Historians should not fail to help expand
the frontiers of historical knowledge.

34.
35.

Flaherty, supra note 13, at 235.
It is not necessary in this regard to agree totally with the conclusion of D. MEL-
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(1982):

Most law can be expressed in ordinary English. Most of it is. But by the time lawyers
get through mushing up ordinary English, very few English speakers and only some
lawyers can recognize it. They throw in words that were headaches before the age of
steam. They try to get by, stuffing law into sentences that aren't built to take the
load. Instead of reflecting the rubbish and keeping the good in the language of the
law, they swallow it whole. And end up with lawsick.
Id. See also Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185
(1967).
36. Plucknett, Frederick William Maitland, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1951).

